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Dangerous Offenders
I. Introduction
The specific focus of this paper is on the Dangerous Offender
provisions in Part XXI of our Criminal Code.' However, the issues
that arise in any form of preventive detention2 go to the heart of our
criminal justice system. Hence, these provisions will be used as a
vehicle for dealing with the broader issues. Ethical considerations will
be discussed as they arise.
The paper begins with an analysis of the history of Part XXI, with
emphasis on the moral and legal problems that had to be faced as the
legislation developed. The legislative history and the case law are
important tools in the analysis but they are only a means to an end.
In this case, the end is to present the problems inherent in preventive
detention.
The paper then turns to deal with the questions that arise from a
"medical model" of dangerousness. Issues to be addressed include
methods of prediction, the effect of an indeterminate sentence on an
offender and the implications for our criminal justice system if we
continue to allow psychiatrists to make determinations of legal
status.
The final section deals with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3 as it applies to Part XXI, and with possible legislative
alternatives. This section is both the most difficult and the most
important because in many ways the conflicting interests involved
are hard to balance. However, the criticism contained in this paper
would be empty if no viable alternatives were put forth.
II. Legal and Procedural Developments
One fundamental premise of our criminal justice system is that people
can only be punished for acts or omissions that contravene the law.
*LL.B., Dalhousie 1985. The original version of this article was prepared in the
context of a seminar on Criminology taught by Professor A. Wayne MacKay at
Dalhousie University.
1. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. 34, ss. 687-695. Herein after "Part XXI" will be
used to refer to the Dalhousie Offender provisions in the Code.
2. The terms "preventive", "indeterminate" and "indefinite" will be used inter-
changeably in this paper.
3. Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) c. 11, Schedule B. Herein after referred to as the
Charter or the Charter of Rights.
Isabel Grant*
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We require the highest standard of proof of a past offence and
persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Preventive
detention is a glaring exception to these principles. The concept of
laws to prevent crime is not abhorrent to our sense of justice, but it is
a long jump from preventive justice to preventive incarceration. How
did this aberration arise?
Price has suggested that the emergence of preventive sentencing
was a result of many trends in the popular criminology of the late
19th century.4 He notes an increase in positivist criminology coupled
with the growing influence of psychiatry on the criminal law. Crime
was starting to be seen as a symptom of mental illness. Society, and
especially the legal profession, were more willing to turn over this
aspect of social control to the medical profession. It was assumed that
there would be adequate safeguards built in to protect the rights of
individuals. Changes were also evident in society's understanding of
the role of punishment. Ironically, it was the emergence of the
rehabilitative ideal that spawned the use of indeterminate sentences.
If the primary goal of imprisonment is rehabilitation, then sentences
must be indeterminate so that a prisoner can be released or detained
according to his degree of reformation. In addition, an indefinite
sentence would motivate the offender to "change his ways" because
his release would depend on it.5
By the mid 20th century, the growth of science had brought with it
a drastic change in ideology. Man was no longer seen as a free moral
agent, but rather as a product of "physiologic and ethnic
determinism". 6 The rationale for indeterminate sentencing was that a
criminal could not change his "criminality", and hence the public
had to be protected from it until the threat was gone.
By the late 1960's indeterminate sentences were attracting increas-
ing criticism.7 They were seen as unnecessarily harsh, and as resulting
in disparate sentences for the same offence. What had been a legisla-
tive or judicial form of sentencing was increasingly becoming an
administrative process. What this means for the offender is that the
4. Price, "Psychiatry, Criminal Law Reform and the 'Mythophilic' Impulses"
(1970), 4 Ott. L. Rev. 1 at 12.
5. The use of the male pronoun in this paper reflects the fact that no woman has
ever been found to be a "dangerous offender".
6. Dershowitz, Fair and Certain Punishment, Twentieth Century Task Force on
Criminal Sentencing, 1976 at 96.
7. eg., Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment: The Prison Business, 1973; American
Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice, 1971.
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length of his sentence is determined by the Parole Board rather than
the court at the end of his trial. In addition, the administrative model
provides far less protection for the individual and leaves him fewer
avenues of appeal.
What then is the proper role for indeterminate sentencing in 1984
in Canada? Is it a valid process that serves to protect society, or is it
largely a symbolic function that allows us to feel protected from
dangerous crime? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to
look at the evolution of the actual legislation which purports to effect
this protection.
1. History
The first Canadian attempt to deal specifically with preventive deten-
tion was the Habitual Offender legislation enacted in 1947.8 The
provisions were aimed at repeat offenders who had been convicted at
least three times of an indictable offence punishable by a sentence of
greater than five years. The Crown also had to establish that the
offender was leading a persistently criminal life and that such a
sentence would be expedient for public protection. Dangerousness
was not a requirement. 9
In 1948, Parliament enacted similar provisions providing for prev-
entive sentencing for "Criminal Sexual Psychopaths". 10 This legisla-
tion had its roots in the United States, where at least one sexual
offender statute had already been struck down as unconstitutional. 1
There was, and remains to this day, a two-tiered test before one
could be incarcerated under the provisions. First, one had to be
convicted of one of a number of enumerated offences. I2 Following
conviction, the Crown could apply to have an individual found to be
a C.S.P. This would result in a judicial determination of whether the
offender had shown an inability to control his sexual impulses, and
whether he was likely to "inflict injury, pain or other evil on any
person".' 3 If found to be a C.S.P., the offender would be sentenced
to an indefinite term of imprisonment in addition to the sentence for
8. S.C. 1947, c. 55, s. 18.
9 This paper deals only with Dangerous Offenders but until 1977 the Habitual and
Dangerous Offender legislation developed along side each other.
10. S.C. 1984, c. 39, s. 43. Herein after Criminal Sexual Psychopath will be referred
to as a C.S.P.
II. People v. Frontozak, 281 N.W. 534 (Mich., 1938).
12.These offences will be discussed below. Until 1977 only sexual offences were dealt
with.
13. Supra, note 9, s. 659(b).
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his substantive offence. 14
In 1953, buggery, bestiality and gross indecency were added to the
list of offences in addition to attempts at any of the listed offences. 15
(One might wonder how bestiality could inflict pain or injury on any
person.)
In 1954, Chief Justice McRuer of the Ontario Supreme Court, was
appointed to chair a committee on the existing C.S.P. provisions and
to report on any necessary amendments. The McRuer Report was
released in 195816 and legislative amendments followed in 196 1.'1
The basic premise of the Report was that the legislation was inef-
fective because so few men had been sentenced under it. 8 One might
question whether the logical conclusion from the low incidence was
that tougher legislation was necessary. The Report blamed the high
standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) and procedural diffi-
culties for the ineffectiveness. These "difficulties" were, of course, the
few procedural protections given to the offender.
Although the Report was clearly weighted in favour of making the
process easier for the Crown, some safeguards for the offender were
recommended. What is shocking, however, is that through selective
enactment of the "reforms", the Legislature tipped the scales even
further in the direction of the Crown. A brief look at some of the
problems found by the Committee illustrates some of the issues that
still plague us today.
Psychiatrists testifying before the Committee were highly critical of
the term "Criminal Sexual Psychopath" because it had no clear
psychiatric (let alone legal) definition. One also gets a sense that the
Committee was not quite sure whether what was needed was a medi-
cal or a legal definition. As a result, the "Criminal Sexual Psycho-
path" was replaced by the "Dangerous Sexual Offender" in the 1961
amendments. 19 It is not clear just how changing the label would assist
psychiatric diagnosis. If there is no psychiatric nosology of "psycho-
14. In 1961 the sentence for the substantive offence was eliminated.
15. S.C. 1953-54, c. 51,ss. 147, 149.
16. McRuer, Report of the Royal Commission on the Criminal Law Relating to
Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 1958. Herein after referred to as 'the Report' and 'the
Committee'.
17. S.C. 1960-61, c. 43, ss. 32, 44-40.
18. Between 1948-55 only 23 men had been sentenced under the provisions. The
first application to have a woman sentenced to preventive detention was not until
1984 and the application failed.
19. S.C. 1960-61, c. 43, s. 32, herein after reffered to as a D.S.O.
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path", then surely "dangerousness" is equally elusive. Perhaps the
change was motivated by the feeling that since psychopaths were
traditionally regarded as "untreatable", any sense of benevolent
treatment-oriented incarceration could not be justified.
The definitional criteria were also changed. The "inability to con-
trol one's sexual impulses" was changed to a 'failure to control one's
sexual impulses". Psychiatrists had told the Committee that "uncon-
trollable" could not be distinguished from "uncontrolled". Whether
a sexual offence per se illustrates a failure to control one's sexual
impulses, or whether it is a controlled and deliberate act, is a complex
question and the courts seem a strange forum in which to answer it.
The other definitional change was the addition of "or is likely to
commit a further sexual offence" as an alternative to "inflicting
injury, pain or other evil".2 ° No one seems to know just why this
phrase was added; it was certainly not part of the McRuer Report.
Whatever its origins, it did not survive long. In 1967, the Supreme
Court of Canada handed down a decision involving a man who had
been convicted of gross indecency and sentenced to preventive deten-
tion. 2 ' Klippert had been involved in consensual homosexual acts.
There had never been, nor (according to the psychiatrists) was there
likely to be, any violence, danger or coercion. However, the psychia-
trists had testified that further homosexual acts were likely. In a
judgment that does not reflect well on the calibre of our judiciary, the
majority held that the likelihood of future homosexuality satisfied the
criteria: "is likely to commit a further sexual offence," because
homosexuality was a crime. Even though the offence involved con-
sent and thus "excluded danger", 22 Fauteux, J. stated that the need
to protect potential victims was not the only purpose of preventive
detention, nor was it even required. This rather bizarre statement was
not explained and one can only guess as to what other purpose
Fauteux, J. may have had in mind. In addition, why did Part XXI
require an initial determination of dangerousness if it was not a sine
qua non?
Cartwright (Hall, J. concurring) wrote a strong dissent decrying
20. S.C. 1960-61, c. 43, s. 32.
21. Klippertv.R., [1967] S.C.R. 822.
22. Ibid., at 836. The Court divided 3:2 against the offender. Spring has noted that
prior to 1970, the S.C.C. divided quite consistently on D.S.O. and Habitual Offend-
er appeals, with Fauteux leading the camp against the offender while Cartwright was
usually in dissent for the accused. The few occasions where the accused did succeed,
were a result of Judson's defection to the minority.
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the literal interpretation given by the majority. He suggested that this
was totally at odds with the legislative intent. A "further sexual
offence" had to be read verba generalia restringunter ad habilitatem
rei vel aptidudinem persona, and thus be interpreted as "a further
sexual offence involving an element of danger to another person".
23
The dissent also noted that our prison system would soon become
overcrowded if every homosexual in Canada were subject to preven-
tive detention.
Klippert probably triggered the 1968 amendment dropping this
phrase, 24 and may also have triggered the addition of what is now
s.15 8,25 decriminalizing, inter alia, all sexual acts between consent-
ing adults in private.
This case startlingly illustrates how subjective and disparate our
attitudes towards sexuality are; and how dangerous it can be to put
such vague legislation in the hands of a judiciary who may or may
not reflect society's values.
The most comprehensive overhaul of the legislation was done in
1977,26 largely as a result of the Ouimet Report. 27 This Report was
highly critical of the existing legislation. In fact, protection of the
public from dangerous offenders was seen by the Committee as one
of the most serious problems in the criminal justice system.28 The
basic premise of the Report was that better identification of danger-
ous offenders (through medical research) would promote a greater
acceptance in society of community-based non-penal "treatment"
for non-dangerous offenders. However, the Committee's proposals
were:
predicted upon the existence of necessary custodial and treatment
facilities appropriate for this class of offender.
29
This is a laudable goal; but the striking lack of psychiatric facilities
in Canadian penitentiaries makes the premise somewhat
questionable.
23. Ibid., at 830-31.
24. S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 76.
25. Ibid., s. 7.
26. S.C. 1976-77,c. 53,s. 14.
27. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, 1969, herein after
referred to as the Ouimet Report or the Report.
28. Ibid., at 241. This is a surprising given that the vast majority of crimes do not
involve violence. Price suggests that misleading and disproportionate attention is
given to sexual offences by the press, and this results in an unnecessary degree of
public concern. Supra, note 4 at 12.
29. Ibid., at 263.
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One of the most welcome changes resulting from the Report was
the repeal of the Habitual Offender Legislation. It was recognized
that indeterminate incarceration of non-violent (and often petty)
criminals could not be justified. It is worthy of note that it took until
1984 before the government attempted to deal with the remaining
Habitual Offenders.
The other major change in 1977 was a recognition that dangerous
sexual offenders are no different from any other class of dangerous
criminal. Thus the "Dangerous Sexual Offender" terminology was
dropped and replaced by one inclusive category of "Dangerous
Offenders". 3 0
Another useful contribution made by the Report was the presenta-
tion of statistics which reflected great disparity in sentencing
throughout Canada. For example, British Columbia had over half of
Canada's Habitual Offenders and Vancouver had four times as many
C.S.P.'s as did Toronto. Surely these figures reinforce the argument
that the entire categorization process is too subjective and lacking in
any clear standards.3 1
Unfortunately the new legislation did not provide the clarity and
specificity for which one would have hoped. What few protections
the Committee did advocate were often watered down. For example,
the Committee recommended that in addition to the existing annual
review by the National Parole Board, there should be provisions
requiring judicial review every three years, with the Court having the
jurisdiction to terminate the sentence.32 The accused would have the
right to counsel, which would be provided for him if he could not
afford to pay. How were these recommendations translated into
legislation? Annual review by the Parole Board was changed to
review every two years. There were no provisions for judicial review
and no mention of the right to counsel. This reflects a fundamental
difference as to who should be making future determinations of
dangerousness. By denying judicial review, the legislature was reject-
ing a legal decision-making process in favour of a psychiatric one. In
fact, the Parole Board almost always follows the medical recommen-
30. Herein after referred to as a D.O.
31. One wonders whether the many years of Social Credit government in B.C. had
any influence.
32. Ouimet Report, supra, note 27 at 262-3. The Report does not say whether the
burden would be on the crown to prove dangerousness or on the offender to disprove
it.
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dations submitted to it. 33
Some recommendations that were followed led to provisions
requiring that at least two psychiatrists testify, one selected by the
accused and one by the Crown, and provisions enabling the Court to
remand the offender to a psychiatric facility for observation.34 Prior
to these amendments, diagnoses were often based on one or two
interviews with the offender, medical records and perhaps evidence
heard at trial;35 very little on which to base a man's future.
-Except for some relatively minor changes made in 1982, the legis-
lation remains as it was in 1978. Very briefly, the provisions provide
for two types of offender: those who have committed "a serious
personal injury offence"" i.e. a serious crime involving violence,
which is punishable by more than ten years; and those who have
committed certain sexual offences. If the individual fits into the first
category, he must have shown a repetitive pattern of violence, indif-
ference to the consequences of his actions or brutality, such that he is
unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behaviour restraint.37
In the case of a sexual offender, he must have shown a failure to
control his sexual impulses, and there must be a likelihood of his
causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons in the future,
through such failure.38 The use of the word "evil" is particularly
strange in this context. It is not to be read ejusdem generis, and hence
does not have to be related to injury or pain.39 This is not consistent
with the rest of Part XXI which has as its very foundation a psychiat-
ric determination of "dangerousness". If we are not dealing with
illness, then what makes a psychiatrist any more qualified to deter-
mine dangerousness than anyone else?
In 1982, the Criminal Code was amended to change the rape
laws, 40 and corresponding changes were required in Part XXI.41 If
one examines the 1982 legislation, the enumerated sexual offences in
Part XXI were rape, attempted rape, sexual intercourse with a female
under fourteen or between fourteen and sixteen, gross indecency and
33. See Ericson, "Psychiatrists in Prison" (1974), 22 Chitty's Law J. 29.
34. Criminal Code, ss. 690, 691.
35. Ouimet Report, supra, note 27 at 254.
36. Criminal Code, s. 687(a).
37. Ibid., s. 688(a). Note the vague standard.
38. Ibid., s. 688(b).
39. R. v.Roestad(1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 264 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
40. S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 19.
41. Ibid., s. 26.
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indecent assault on a male or female.42 In 1984, the enumerated
offences are limited to the three levels of sexual assault, i.e. sexual
assault, sexual assault with a weapon and aggravated sexual
assault.
43
One can see that sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen,
or between fourteen and sixteen, and gross indecency have been
dropped. The elimination of offences based on age is interesting
because a man could have been convicted of such an offence even if
he reasonably believed that the female was over sixteen. 4 4 In theory,
under the pre 1983 legislation, a man could have been found to be a
D.O. even if he had no knowledge or intention of committing a
crime. In practice, of course, the Crown would not seek to have such
a person found to be a D.O. The other interesting element is the
obvious sex discrimination in such offences.
The removal of gross indecency was a long overdue change, and is
consistent with the belief that Part XXI should only apply to danger-
ous criminals. If acts of indecency involve violence, they could easily
fit under one of the sexual assault offences.
This brief history of Part XXI has sought to illustrate some of the
inherent moral and legal problems in any system of preventive jus-
tice. Unfortunately, the courts have exacerbated rather than relieved
these problems. It is to this that we must now turn.
2. Procedural Issues
Given the severity of an indeterminate sentence one would expect
that the judiciary would interpret evidentiary and procedural rules in
a manner that would give maximum protection to the accused. To
the contrary, they have fallen far short. By relegating a D.O. hearing
to the status of "merely part of the sentencing process" and not a
trial, the judiciary have effectively robbed the offender of many
safeguards.
Perhaps the landmark case in this regard was the Supreme Court
of Canada decision in Wilband v. R.45 Fauteux, J. for the majority
held that the hearsay rule excluding second hand evidence did not
apply to a Part XXI hearing. It was essential that psychiatrists have
42. Buggery and bestiality were dropped from Part XXI in the 1976-77 amend-
ments. However, since buggery is punishable by 14 years, it could presumably fit
under the more general s. 687(a).
43. Criminal Code, s. 687.
44. Criminal Code, s. 146.
45. [1967] S.C.R. 14.
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access to all possible sources of information including second hand
sources like prison files, old medical records, etc. It was deemed to be
within the psychiatrist's expertise to determine the accuracy and
realiability of such evidence. One might question whether interpret-
ing the accuracy of prison records is something psychiatrists study in
medical school!
It is easy to understand the rationale behind this finding; surely we
want the predictions to be as accurate as possible, which requires as
much information as we can get. But, this is precisely why there must
be a requirement that the accuracy of such evidence be proven.
Such a broad statement as "any second hand sources" has natural-
ly led to inconsistent decisions, with judges uncertain as to how far
this practice should be expanded.
In R. v. Kanester,46 the British Columbia Court of Appeal relied
on Wilband in making two rather startling findings. The accused was
convicted of rape, and found to be a Dangerous Sexual Offender.4 7
At the Part XXI hearing, the trial judge allowed testimony of allega-
tions of previous offences which had never been proven. The Court of
Appeal affirmed this practice because section 661(2)48 stated that any
relevant evidence could be heard. What was totally ignored by the
Court was that evidence is only relevant if it is true, and that by
considering such unreliable and prejudicial testimony, the Court
could easily have made an erroneous determination of dangerous-
ness. The Court of Appeal also agreed that the trial judge could admit
the testimony of two psychiatrists who had never examined the
accused. Their opinions were based on the allegations of previous
offences (which multiplies the prejudicial effect) and "extensive read-
ing of medical files". The Court of Appeal simply cited Wilband as
authority for this, and made no mention of the fact that in Wilband
the extraneous evidence was used to supplement the information
gained from examining the offender, not to replace it. Moreover, in
Wilband, Fauteux, J. had stressed the fact that the hearsay evidence
had not had a large impact on the psychiatric opinion.
Kanester can be contrasted with R. v. Knight49 where a Crown
application for D.S.O. status was dismissed because one of the two
examining psychiatrists testified that without the information from
46. [1968] 1 C.C.C. 351 (B.C.C.A.).
47. Under what was then s. 661.
48. Nows. 690.
49. (1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 343 (Ont. H.CJ.).
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police files regarding previous offences (for which the charges had
been dropped), he would not have been able to give an opinion as to
whether the accused was likely to cause harm in the future. Morden,
J. held that when one psychiatrist cannot reach an opinion without
reference to materials of which the judge cannot take cognisance, the
Crown has not met its burden of proof. Wilband was distinguished
because in Knight the psychiatrists were being asked to evaluate
police files, and this was not within their skill and training as old
medical files might be.
The testimony of Dr. Jerry Cooper, noted by Morden, J. in
Knight, casts doubt on the Kanester decision. When asked whether
the examination or the extrinsic material was more important in
forming an opinion, he replied:
I feel one must consider both... One without the other you just
can't, at least I couldn't come to any conclusion."'
One can understand why Kanester was decided as it was. If an
offender could thwart the whole process by refusing to speak to the
psychiatrists, it would certainly be an easy way out. Lawyers would
probably advise their clients to remain silent. However, when an
individual refuses to talk, as Mr. Kanester did, the Court should base
its decision on the other evidence before it. In these circumstances,
psychiatric testimony should be dispensed with. 5' This may or may
not prejudice an accused but that is the risk he takes. No psychiatric
testimony is better than inaccurate testimony.
In Wilband 2 the Supreme Court also dealt with the issue of volun-
tary confessions. In a criminal trial, if an accused has confessed to a
person in authority, the Crown must show that the confession was
made voluntarily. The argument in the context of dangerous offend-
ers is that an offender who is required to undergo a psychiatric
examination which may determine his status, cannot be seen to be in
a position where his statements are made voluntarily. The Supreme
Court held that a dangerous offender hearing does not involve the
conviction of an offence. Rather, it is part of the sentencing process,
or "Merely the assertion of a status or condition". 53 Thus, the normal
confession rules do not apply, but even if they did, a psychiatrist is
50. Ibid., at 351.
51. As the law stands however, the judge is required to hear the testimony of at least
two psychiatrists. Sees. 690(1).
52. [1967] S.C.R. 14.
53. Ibid., at 19.
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not a person in authority. This is fallacious in two ways.
First, it may appear to be part of sentencing, but in fact a Part XXI
hearing is much more. The offender is not being sentenced for his
substantive offence; he is being punished for what he is, not for what
he has done. The determination of dangerousness involves the pres-
entation of witnesses and other evidence from which a decision of
mixed fact and law is deduced. This decision determines the ultimate
disposition of the offender. Given a positive finding of dangerous-
ness, the substantive offences plays no role in the sentence.
Secondly, saying a psychiatrist is not a person in authority is
ignoring the realities of the situation. In most cases the offender is
remanded to a psychiatric facility. It does not require much imagina-
tion to recognise that the psychiatrist is not only the guardian of the
offender's present liberty; he also has the power to determine the
individual's future. That is authority.
This writer is not suggesting that statements made to a psychiatrist
are never voluntary. What is being suggested is that the psychiatrist is
as much a member of the criminal justice system, in this context, as a
policeman is in some other contexts. Until this is recognized, suffi-
cient safeguards cannot be established.
There are other exceptions to the rules of evidence, but the two
discussed above illustrate both the tendency of the courts to steer
away from due process and the dubious nature of some of the predic-
tions relied upon. These exceptions are particularly striking in view of
the fact that judges frequently rely on the stringent procedural protec-
tions to justify indeterminate sentencing.
The judiciary may also feel more secure in their findings knowing
that their decisions will be reviewed by the Parole Board after only
three years. After all (this reasoning goes) if the individual had been
sentenced for the substantive offence, he would not come up for
parole until much later. Thus, if a judge makes an error in classifying
someone as dangerous, in theory at least, the error can be corrected.
If a judge errs in the other direction, the errors will become all too
apparent. This leads one to suspect that the judiciary would tend to
err on the side of caution. What we have, in effect, is a delegation of
the sentencing authority from the judiciary to the Parole Board. This
is not satisfactory for several reasons.
First, it is trite to say that an administrative model of sentencing
deprives the accused of many of the protections afforded in a judicial
model. More importantly, one must realize that the label of "dan-
gerous offender" will inevitably colour the perception of the offender
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by virtually everyone in the legal system; from prison guard to psy-
chiatrist and ultimately the Parole Board. Once this label has been
attached, the onus is inevitably on the offender to establish that he is
not dangerous. This could be a very difficult task in the prison envir-
onment. How does one establish that one would not be dangerous if
one were released into society? In the words of one forensic
psychiatrist
. once you have been defined as dangerous, it is extremely diffi-
cult to prove you are not dangerous. That's because there is not
anyone in this room.., who is not capable of violence in a particu-
lar set of circumstances. 
54
Moreover, if one were labelled and treated as a dangerous person, is
it not possible that one would learn to react in kind? It is an obvious
case of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The inevitable despair that one
would feel could only foster further emotional problems. Given that a
D.O. serves an average of seventeen years, and that virtually no one
is released after the first three year review, it becomes apparent that
this delegation of sentencing authority is not acceptable. Although
the offender may be at a disadvantage at the Part XXI hearing, it is
only here that his status can be determined with any modicum of
objectivity.
Some commentators have suggested that this regular review by the
Parole Board serves only to enhance the offender's hostility towards
the institution.5 5 To go through a process repeatedly that inevitably
results in failure is devastating in any context; but even worse when
one is incarcerated. One cannot help but wonder whether the review
provisions are there to appease our insecurity rather than that of the
offender.
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss plea bargaining,
but it must be realized that the threat of a Part XXI hearing is a
powerful tool in the hands of a Crown prosecutor. It could easily
coerce an individual into pleading guilty to an offence that he did not
commit, simply to avoid this possibility.56 For if an individual has a
bad record, and a weak case, it would be far safer to accept a certain
prison term than to face the risk of indeterminate incarceration.
54. Dr. C. Webster testifying before the Leggatt inquiry into Habitual Offenders:
quoted in the Ottawa Citizen, January 30, 1984.
55. See Price, supra, note 4. It is also important to note that no D.O. sentenced
under the 1977 provisions has yet been released.
56. Klein, "Habitual Offender Legislation and the Bargaining Process" (1970), 15
Crim. L.Q.
Dangerous Offenders 360
3. Standard of Proof
A further procedural problem with any system of preventive justice is
that of finding a reasonable standard of proof; one which will be fair
to the accused, yet not place an inordinate burden on the Crown.
Although it is generally accepted that the Crown must show beyond
a reasonable doubt that the individual is a dangerous offender,5 7 this
leads to obvious problems.
How does one prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at some time
in some setting, an individual is likely to endanger some person.
Surely if we add "beyond a reasonable doubt" to a "future likeli-
hood" the sum total can be no greater than a balance of probabili-
ties; a standard we would never accept in a criminal trial. Given the
judicial recognition that:
the evidence of a psychiatrist... is at times highly speculative and
in certain instances a lay person is in as good a position to make
predictions as to future dangerousness5 8
how can one ever feel morally certain as to dangerousness?
A recent Alberta case illustrates the confusion and lack of concep-
tual clarity surrounding the burden of proof. In R. v. Carleton, 5 9 the
majority of the Court held that the Crown must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offender has committed a personal injury
offence, has shown a failure to control his sexual impulses, and has
shown a likelihood of causing danger to others. This is in stark
contrast to the legislation which repeatedly refers to future behaviour
and future likelihood. The Alberta Court of Appeal seems to be
sentencing the offender to preventive detention for past acts: an
obvious contradiction. In effect, they are ignoring the problems
inherent in predictive justice, by interpreting the legislation as reac-
tive justice.
In 1958, the McRuer Report suggested that the standard of proof
be reduced to a preponderance of probabilities. 6 However, this
recommendation was not incorporated into the legislation nor picked
up by the judiciary. Schiffer has suggested that the recommendation
57. R. v. Neil, [1957] S.C.R. 685.
58. ReMoore and the Queen (1984), 10 C.C.C. (3d) (Ont. S.C.).
59. (1983), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (Alta. C.A.).
60. McRuer, supra note 15 at 124. The A.G. of Ontario had gone so far as to
suggest that every person should, prima facie, be deemed to be a C.S.P. on the
prescribed certificates of 2 psychiatrists.
361 The Dalhousie Law Journal
was:
motivated by a desire to make judicial acceptance of psychiatric
predictions seem less ludicrous.6 '
Perhaps the rejection of the lower standard was motivated by a desire
to appear to be protecting the rights of the individual. However, this
protection is more apparent that real, as was recognized by Morden,
J. in Knight:
I am not imposing myself an obligation to find it proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that certain events will happen - this, in the
nature of things, would be impossible in practically every case.62
He went on to require "an existing basis for finding present likeli-
hood of future conduct". 6 3 Is this anything more than speculation?
The high standard in criminal law involves a trade off: what we
gain in certainty of guilt, we lose in taking the risk that more guilty
persons will go free. This is a conscious choice, however, and reflects
the value our society places on individual liberty. Part XXI is in stark
contrast to this concept. It is almost impossible to predict future
behaviour, and all the more difficult when dealing with rare violent
behaviour.
The leading American commentator on preventive detention sug-
gests that we:
would have to reverse the traditional maxim of the criminal law
and adopt a philosophy that it is better to confine ten people who
would not commit predicted crimes than to release one who
would.
64
This criticism may be slightly unfair in the context of Part XXI. The
Americans use preventive detention on a much greater scale than
Canada does and we do not begin the prediction process until an
individual has been convicted of at least one serious offence. Howev-
er, the questions raised by Dershowitz and others cannot be ignored;
it is on our answers that the legitimacy of Part XXI depends.
III. The Medical Model
1. Predictions
Many of the problems with the standard of proof arise from the fact
61. Schiffer,Mental Disorder and the Criminal Trial Process, 1978 at 277.
62. R. v. Knight, supra, note 49 at 356.
63. Ibid.
64. Dershowitz, "Preventive Detention" in Goldstein and Goldstein (eds.) Crime,
Law and Society 1971, at 313.
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that Part XXI determinations of dangerousness are based largely on
psychiatric predictions of future conduct. It is thus necessary to exam-
ine these predictions to determine the validity of this system. How
accurate are they; to what use should we put them, and most impor-
tantly, what cost, in terms of error, are we as a society willing to
accept?
The most commonly used predictive devices are lists of factors
which consistently have a high incidence in "dangerous" individuals.
A careful analysis of such lists suggests a fundamental limitation.
Consider the following factors put forth by the authors of a study on
dangerous sexual offenders.
1. brutality sustained in childhood
2. bedwetting, firesetting, and cruelty to animals
3. assorted delinquent acts during puberty
4. escalation of the sexual offences
5. inter-related criminality with sexual offences
6. sustained excitement prior to the act and at the time of the
offence
7. lack of concern for the victim
8. bizarre fantasies with minor offences
9. explosive outbursts
10. absence of psychosis
11. absence of alcohol consumption
12. high I.Q.
65
Each factor is graded on a 10 point scale and a score of over 90 is
"indicative of a very high degree of dangerousness". 66 In a similar
study by Abrahamsen, the list included spelling errors, loneliness and
excessive truancy.
67
It may well be that all the above factors are frequently found in
dangerous individuals. The flaw is that such criteria may also be
found in non-violent persons with emotional problems, and such lists
fail to discriminate between the two groups. Until such a distinction
can be made, surely we cannot accept a method with such inherent
weakness.
Probably the most interesting study of dangerousness was that
which resulted from the United States Supreme Court decision in
Baxstrom v. Herold.6 8 The Court held that it was unconstitutional to
65. Marcus and Conway, "Dangerous Sexual Offender Project", (1969) 11 Can. J.
Corr. 198 at 204 cited in Schiffer, supra, note 61.
66. Ibid., at 205.
67. Abrahamsen, Our Violent Society, 1970 at 218.
68. Ibid., at 107.
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retain indefinitely prisoners who had completed their sentence but
were not released because they were deemed to be dangerous. Subse-
quently, 967 "dangerous" individuals were transferred to civil men-
tal hospitals, and within four years over one third had been
released. 69 Of the entire group only 26 (less than 3%) were returned
to maximum security hospitals. Steadman tried to differentiate these
26 from the 941 non-returnees. He found that on average the retur-
nees were younger and scored higher on a dangerousness scale. The
age factor will be considered later but the important fact here was
that over 90% of those who scored highly on the dangerousness scale
did not commit further violent crimes.7" These figures have been
criticized by some because obviously in the real world one cannot
design an experiment with perfect controls. However, the substance
of Steadman's results has stood up to this criticism. One can see that
over 97% of the original predictions of dangerousness were incorrect.
The final method of study to be addressed here is that which
compares recidivism rates for individuals released as non-dangerous
by psychiatrists, with those of individuals released by the courts
against the wishes of the psychiatrists. The most impressive statistics
in support of prediction come from a 1971 study in the United States.
The authors (the psychiatrists) collected information on 592
patients admitted to their hospital for psychiatric assessments of
dangerousness. Of these, 435 were released; 386 on the recommenda-
tions of the doctors and 49 against their recommendation. 7 The
recidivism rate for those released against psychiatric advice was 35%
as compared to 8% in the group who were released with medical
approval. Statistically, the difference is highly significant and initial-
ly the results appear to be very impressive. However, of the 49
released against medical advice, the error rate in the predictions was
still 65%: for every correctly identified dangerous offender detained,
the doctors would have had to detain more than twice as many
non-dangerous individuals.
All of the above methods of study are subject to two serious
conceptual failures which go to the heart of the predictive system.
The first of these is the "false-positive" problem; the number of
69. Steadman and Halfon "The Baxstrom Patients: Backgrounds and Outcomes"
(1971) 3 Sem. Psychiat. 376.
70. Steadman, "Follow Up on Baxstrom Patients" (1973), 130 Am. J. Psychiat.
317 at 319.
71. Kozol, Boucher and Garofalo, "Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness"
(1972) 18 Crim. and Del. 371 at 389.
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individuals erroneously identified as dangerous. Studies have shown
this rate to be anywhere from 2 to 100 times the rate of true posi-
tives." What this means in terms of human life is that in order to
confine 10 dangerous men, we would have to confine anywhere from
20-1000 non-dangerous men, and it is fair to say that most studies
show results closer to the higher figure. In this respect, the Kozol
study is an anomaly.
The second problem in these studies flows from the first. The
predictors, be they the courts, the psychiatrists or the National Parole
Board, only see one type of error. A person mistakenly labelled as
non-dangerous will make headlines if he commits another violent
offence. What is impossible to measure is how many of those con-
fined as dangerous would not have committed a violent offence if
they had been released.
Professor Derschowitz did a survey of all the published literature
on predictions of anti-social behaviour. His conclusions were not
very encouraging. He found that:
psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors, inaccurate in an
absolute sense, and even less accurate when compared with other
professionals .... Even more significant for legal purposes: it seems
psychiatrists are particularly prone to one type of error
-over-prediction."3
As was mentioned above, one can sympathize with the tendency to
over-predict. Psychiatrists' false positives are locked up in prisons or
hospitals. Their false negatives may come back to haunt them in
headlines or even in law suits.74 Not only does the individual doctor
have a vested interest in over-prediction, the credibility of the profes-
sion is also at stake. It is indisputable that the public, where possible,
must be protected. However, what is not acceptable is the view that
the incarceration of non-dangerous individuals is just an inevitable
side effect of preventive detention.
There is a further methodological problem in predictive justice.
Ethically we cannot make predictions of dangerousness and then
release the individuals to see whether our predictions were accurate.
72. Diamond, 'The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness" (1974) 123 U. of Pa.
L.R. 439 at 447. The figure suggested by Diamond is from 10-100.
73. Dershowitz, 'The Law of Dangerousness - Some Fictions About Predictions"
(1970), 23 J. of Leg. Ed. 26 at 46.
74. See for e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the U. of Cal. (1978) 551 P. 2d 334 where
the California Supreme Court found a psychiatrist liable in negligence for releasing a
patient without warning his future victim that he might be dangerous.
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We are immediately limited to a population already confined; who
have already been labelled, at some stage of the process, as potential-
ly dangerous.
Thus far, this paper has dealt with the most straightforward aspects
of the prediction process. It is now necessary to consider some of the
more subtle influences. In his recent study of dangerous offenders,
Professor Dickens found that almost half of those studied had:
something physically peculiar about them... It is very much the
Frankenstein factor. It is fear of the unknown.75
This raises interesting questions about causation. Are the diagnoses
influenced by such peculiarities or are individuals with such abnor-
malities more likely to turn to violence in an attempt to deal with
society's reaction to them? Although both suggestions are purely
speculative, there is evidence that could be used to support either. It is
well documented that dangerous offenders have a high incidence of
childhood abuse; the problem is drawing any causal link.
The possibility that diagnoses may be affected by such traits raises
some troublesome questions. Klein, a sociologist, has suggested that
psychiatric labelling is largely an outcome of the setting in which the
patient is seen, the social class of the patient, and the biasing effect of
other clinicians' diagnoses. 76 Consider the following study. Subjects
were required to observe a film in which a healthy man was labelled
as psychotic by a well known psychiatrist. All subjects, including
psychiatrists, then tended to diagnose the man as being mentally ill
even though he did not behave as such.77 A further study found
similar results even where the suggestion of psychosis was made by
someone other than a renowned psychiatrist.
In the context of dangerousness, the implications are obvious.
When psychiatrists assess patients for a Part XXI hearing, the Crown,
and probably the police, have already labelled the individual as being
dangerous. Add to this the physical oddities noted by Dickens and
one can see how the assessment could lose all neutrality. As Wenk
suggests:
the prediction equation contains the seed of a self-fulfilling pro-
phecy: those who have been noticed before, will be noticed
75. Professor Dickens quoted in the Globe and Mail November 14, 1983 at 4.
76. Klein, "The Dangerousness of Dangerous Offender Legislation" (1976) 18
Can. J. of Crim. and Corr. 109.
77. Ibid., at 112.
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again ....... the decisions involved vary by characteristics of
persons other than the offender.78
That such factors can influence our perception of an individual has
not been lost on the offender. The following is from the Leggatt
inquiry into Habitual Offenders:
I've always been described as that big negro. When I'm outside I
can't walk two feet without a cop stopping me. And when they
write about me it's always "Sam Cleveland that big negro." 7 9
Much medical and scientific study has been devoted to
dangerousness. Most of the conclusions are, at best, tenuous.
However, one finding that appears to be made consistently is that
dangerousness decreases as an offender reaches middle age."° This
has ramifications for the entire process. First, Part XXI is set up to
deal with individuals who have committed several offences. Most
individuals classed as D.O.'s are well over thirty. (Thomas Lyons is
the obvious exception at age 16.) Hence it is quite possible that we
are confining individuals at the end of their "dangerous years".
Secondly, if this finding about age is accurate, it is harder to justify
long indeterminate sentences. If, as the psychiatrists claim,
dangerousness diminishes at middle age, why do sentencing practices
not reflect this? It is not being suggested that we lock up individuals
idenfinitely in the early stages of their "criminal career". What is
being suggested is that indeterminate sentencing cannot be justified
even as a necessary evil. The sentences in the Criminal Code for
substantive offences are more than adequate for public protection.
2. Effectiveness ofMedicalModel
As we have seen in the previous section, there is a real danger in the
use of psychiatric predictions; errors are perpetuated rather than dis-
covered. As soon as a label is attached, all of the offender's behaviour
is seen as a function of that label. If the offender protests, it is seen as
a problem with him rather than with the system. Perhaps most
importantly, the onus inevitably shifts to the offender to establish
that he is not dangerous.
78. Wenk, Robinson and Smith, "Can Violence Be Predicted?" (1972), 18 Crime
and Del. 393 at 401.
79. Quoted in the Ottawa Citizen, January 30, 1984 at p. 6.
80. Roth, "Modem Neurology and Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal
Responsibility" in Hucker, Webster and Aron (eds.) Mental Disorder and Criminal
Responsibility, 1981 at 106.
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The medical model is paramount at all stages of the process. The
psychiatrist has a great influence on who is labelled a D.O., how that
individual will be treated in the system, and ultimately, on whether
the offender is fit for release:
The psychiatrist becomes gentle jailer, polite policeman. His
patient is no longer, except marginally, his client. He serves the
public order - with such kindness, at best, that constraint permits
... (to) escape, (one) must yield not only outerly but innerly. The
wildest tyrants in their wildest fantasies have not required more."
Viewing crime as sickness brings in the concepts of treatment and
cure. However, because "dangerousness" is said to be untreatable,
the only option may be to confine the individual indefinitely until the
disease "burns itself out".
This is not to suggest that the psychiatric profession has a vindic-
tive attitude towards the offender. In many cases the aim is to help
the offender as well as to protect his potential victims. The question
that arises is whether these two objectives can be met concurrently.
The dangerous offender is already the lowest of the low in the prison
hierarchy; if he is a sexual offender, as most D.O.'s are, he faces
constant abuse and even threats to his life from the other inmates.
It is not surprising that if and when a D.O. does get out, his anger
and sense of persecution could add to an already violent potential.
The system perpetuates violence, it does not alleviate it. This is why a
population of inmates appealed to the Attorney General of Nova
Scotia not to allow a sixteen year old boy to serve an indeterminate
term. It is also why the Ouimet Report felt that indeterminate senten-
ces were necessary. The reasoning in the report suggests that an
offender would probably be more violent after a long prison sentence
than he was on entering the institution; hence the necessity of an
indeterminate term.82
Violence is not the only possible response. The prison environment
may also require complete submission and dependence. The offender
must play by the rules if he hopes to secure release; or as Ericson puts
it: "sell out to get out".83 The Catch 22 here is obvious. If an offender
does not yield to the demands for passivity, he will not get out. If he
does, how will he ever cope in a competitive society, especially since
81. Seeley, The Americanization of the Unconscious 1967, at 43.
82. Ouimet Report, supra, note 27.
83. Ericson, "Penal Psychiatry in Canada: The Method of Our Madness", (1976),
26 U. ofT. L.J. 17 at 26.
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he has been branded for life? It is uniformly accepted that prison at
best does not rehabilitate and at worst can result in "fragmentation
of the personality". 84 In the words of the head of Special Treatment
Services at Kingston Pennitentiary:
I have the feeling that 15 years solid time is as much as anyone can
handle. If society hates someone so much, why don't they bring
back the death penalty?8 5
Before concluding this section, it is important to touch on the
grave moral and political implications for a system which allows
determinations of legal status to be delegated to the psychiatric pro-
fession. The label of dangerousness is a political choice. It is a reflec-
tion of the degree to which we are willing to infringe on the liberty of
others for the benefit of society as a whole. As Dershowitz has
suggested, as long as we deny that it is a political decision, we will
never be in the position to make an informed choice.
The testimony of the expert must be exposed to the glaring light of
public understanding, so that the people and not the pundits, may
decide how much deprivation of human liberty should be permit-
ted to achieve a tolerable level of safety.86
It appears that we do not feel able to deal with the dangerous
offender without relying heavily on the medical profession. But this
reliance has caused contradictions within the philosophic assumptions
behind preventive detention. Our criminal justice system is founded
on the belief that man is, within limits, a free agent who chooses his
actions. If one does not have the capacity to choose, one should not
be held responsible. However, if we follow through the logic of
preventive detention, it runs as such: "This individual must be
detained indefinitely, because if released he will commit further
offences". Free will presupposes the ability to choose to act and to
refrain from action; preventive incarceration presupposes determinism.
There is no recognition that the individual could choose not to
offend, or that he could change. If we are saying he cannot choose
and cannot change, then he should be relieved of responsibility. In
effect, we are deciding for him that he will choose to be violent
because he has done so in the past. We are punishing him for acts he
chose, yet denying he could choose otherwise in the future. Such a
84. Price, "Mentally Disordered and Dangerous Persons Under the Criminal Law",
(1970) 12 Can. J. Corr. 241 at 245.
85. Dr. R. McCalden, quoted in the Globe and Mail, November 14, 1983, at 4.
86. Dershowitz, supra, note 73 at 31.
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contradiction goes far beyond the individual offender to reflect omi-
nously on our criminal justice system. For as Ericson suggests:
to the extent that we remain content to hire "dirty workers" to
carry out the unpleasant tasks of social control, and enshrine them
to the point that we really think that they are doing something for
the offender's therapeutic benefit as well as our own social benefit,
we are all responsible for displacing our responsibilities.87
It is the legal system which has granted this inordinate power to
psychiatrists and it is thus the legal profession who must ensure that
the power is used appropriately.
IV. Potentialfor Reform
1. The Charter ofRights
Any area of law that deals with basic individual rights must now be
re-examined in the light of our new Canadian Charter ofRights and
Freedoms.8 8 However, those critics of Part XXI who hoped that the
Charter would be a vehicle for reform will be sadly disappointed. The
judiciary has shown a disheartening lack of imagination in
interpreting the Charter as it applies to Part XXI. There seem to be
pat answers which are applied almost by rote with virtually no
analysis of the issues involved. There is also great reliance on the
Canadian Bill of Rights8 9 case law.
There are several sections of the Charter which bring into question
the validity of Part XXI: section 7 which guarantees the right not to
be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person, except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice; section 9
which guarantees the right not to be arbitrarily imprisoned; section
11 (c) protecting the right not to be a witness against oneself; section
1 (d) guaranteeing the right to be presumed innocent; section 1 1(f)
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial and probably most importantly,
section 12 which protects the right not to be subject to cruel and
unusual punishment or treatment. Emphasis will be put on ss. 7, 9
and 12 because these sections raise the most serious questions. Two
87. Ericson, supra, note 83 at 18.
88. Supra, note 3.
89. S.C. 1960, c. 44, (R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III) herein after referred to as the Bill
of Rights).
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recent Canadian cases, Re Moore and the Queen,90 and R. v. Lyons9
will be heavily relied on because they provide an interesting context
in which to examine these issues: the Moore case being the first Part
XXI application brought against a female offender and Lyons the
first application brought against a sixteen year old boy. Before
dealing with the major questions of ss. 7, 9 and 12, there will be a
brief discussion of the other sections which have led to Charter
challenges.
Section 11(c)
The right not to be compelled as a witness against oneself has been
narrowly interpreted so as to apply only to testimony against oneself
on the witness stand.9 2 There have not been any Charter cases on
whether the mandatory psychiatric examination violates the right
against self-incrimination. However, this argument was rejected in R.
v. Gribble93 in which the forerunner of s. 1 (c) in the Bill of Rights
was challenged. The Court held that an individual could refuse to
talk to a psychiatrist or to call him as a witness on his own behalf.
The Court noted that in these circumstances, the judge would be free
to nominate a psychiatrist for the accused and to call him as a
witness.
Section 11(d)
There has been a surprising lack of attention given to the
presumption of innocence with regard to Part XXI. Although no
application can be made under Part XXI until after a conviction, the
offender is by no means being sentenced for only his substantive
offence. Rather, he is being detained for offences he might have
committed if released. This is clearly offensive to our usual
requirement that the Crown prove all aspects of an offence that has
been committed. This issue was also raised in Gribble94 under the Bill
of Rights. Cavanagh, J. held that a Part XXI hearing was to be
treated as an additional element of guilt in which the Crown must
prove dangerousness. The presumption of innocence applies only in
so far as the accused is presumed not to be a dangerous offender until
90. Supra, note 58.
91. (1984), 62 N.S.R. (2d) 383 (N.S. Co. Ct.); affd. (1984), 13 W.C.B. 3
(N.S.S.C., A.D.). Leave to appeal to the S.C.C. has been granted on the s. 7 and s.
12 arguments.
92. See for e.g., R. v. Ahtseimer (1982), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 7 (Ont. C.A.).
93. [1979] 4 W.W.R. 659 (Alta. S.C.).
94. Ibid.
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proven so. This approach clearly suggests that dangerousness is a
status offence and that an individual is being punished not for what
he has done but for what he is.
Section 11(/)
This is the one legal right in our Charter that has no forerunner in the
Bill of Rights and thus we are not restricted by earlier decisions.
However, the courts have made it abundantly clear that a Part XXI
hearing is only part of the sentencing process and the right to a jury
trial does not extend to sentencing; it applies only prior to
conviction.95
It seems safe to say that none of the above sections present any real
threat to Part XXI. It is thus necessary to look at those sections which
raise more serious problems.
Section 7
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice.
The forerunner of s.7 was s. l(a) of the Bill of Rights, under which
one could only be deprived of life, liberty or security of the person if it
was done by due process of law. In R. v. Roestad,9 6 the accused
argued that the Dangerous Sexual Offender provisions were
discriminatory because: i) one group of offenders was being treated
differently from other offenders, and ii) all the offenders within the
group were not treated equally because not all D.S.O.'s were
sentenced to preventive detention.
Graburn, J. rejected both of these arguments. The principle of
equality before the law was not violated by treating dangerous
individuals differently because this difference was authorized by
legislation. This logic seems to rob s. 1(a) of any real substance. It
would be all too easy for a government to deny these rights if done by
legislation. Graburn, J. also held that equality before the law
mandated a fair hearing; it did not require similar treatment for all
offenders. Section 1(a) was of no effect because any discrimination
there was in the process was not based on "race, national origin,
colour, religion or sex", and since these were the only forms of
95. R. v. Simon (No. 2) (1982), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 478 (N.W.T.S.C.).
96. (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 564 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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discrimination expressed in the Bill ofRights, the argument failed.9 7
A similar argument was made under s.7 of the Charter in R. v.
Gustavson.98 It was argued that dangerous offenders form a homo-
genous group and thus should all be subject to the same punishment.
The British Columbia Supreme Court held that Part XXI was
designed to enable a judge to acquire a complete picture of the
offender. This enables the judge to tailor the sentence to the
individual.
Section 7 has also been used to challenge the predictive aspects of
Part XXI. In Re Moore and the Queen9 9 the applicant argued that
psychiatric predictions are so speculative that they violate the princi-
ple of fundamental justice that requires all evidence to be of probative
weight. Ewaschuk, J. acknowledged the inaccuracy of such evidence
but discarded this argument because the final determination of dan-
gerousness is always made by a judge. Although the probative value
of predictions diminishes over time, he relied on the Parole Board to
correct any errors that might be made. The initial three years before
review could be:
justified on the basis that the applicant must be punished for the
predicate offence as well as detained because of the potential
danger.' 00
Was the learned Justice unaware that the legislature had dropped this
two-tiered sentencing structure in 1961?
Section 9
Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned.
Part XXI allows for discretion at several levels of the process. Each
level has been the subject of an unsuccessful Charter challenge. The
major areas of concern are the initial prosecutorial discretion as to
when to bring a Part XXI application, and the subsequent judicial
discretion as to whether to sentence the individual to preventive
97. It is certainly arguable that there is sex discrimination. There are a dispropor-
tionate number of homosexual D.O.'s and in almost 40 years of preventive deten-
tion, there has yet to be a female D.O. This is also interesting in light of the broad
wording of s. 15 of the Charter which does not limit the protection to the rights
enumerated therein.
98. (1982), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 470 (B.C.S.C.).
99. Supra, note 58. This does not really answer Ms. Moore's argument because the
judge will inevitably be influenced by the very evidence being challenged.
100. Ibid., at 311.
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detention.' ° ' It is perhaps unnecessary to state that in all of these
cases it is assumed that arbitrary application of the provisions neces-
sarily results in arbitrary imprisonment.
i) Prosecutorial Discretion
Since there is no obligation on the Crown to bring a Part XXI
application, nor any clear statutory guidelines, it has been argued
that the provisions have been applied arbitrarily, resulting in discrim-
ination against certain groups of offenders. Support for this argument
can be found in the vast disparity with which the provisions have
been applied throughout Canada. As has been discussed above, Van-
couver had four times as many dangerous offenders as did Toronto
prior to 1975. The figures for habitual offenders were even worse
with almost half occurring in British Columbia. 02
These statistics recently received judicial notice in the Lyons case:
... one prosecutor in Vancouver had made (Part XXI) his pet
field so that you had more prosecutions in that province than in all
the other provinces combined.' 03
Mr. Justice 0 Hearn does not seem very distressed by these figures.
Despite the blatent abuse of power that the statistics reflect, he
simply pays lip service to them and then goes on to hold that the
provisions are not arbitrary. He simply reiterates that the procedural
protections are sufficient to prevent arbitrary application. At no stage
does he attempt to reconcile the figures he has noted with the provi-
sions of section 9. They are simply discarded as "past history", *04
Other cases have not added greatly to this judicial wisdom. There
has been great reliance on the Supreme Court of Canada decision Ex
Parte Matticks'05 in which it was held that the Habitual Offender
provisions did not offend the Bill of Rights. However, Matticks is of
questionable application to Part XXI. The decision consisted of:
We are also satisfied that s. 688 of the Criminal Code is not
rendered inoperative by the Canadian Bill of Rights. 106
It is this judgment that has been relied on as decisive for our present
101. The discretion of the Parole Board was challenged in Re Mitchell and the
Queen (1983), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (H.C.J.). The s. 9 challenge failed but Mitchell
succeeded on other grounds.
102. Supra, note 32.
103. Supra, note 91 at 386.
104. Ibid.
105. (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 438.
106. Ibid., at 438.
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legislation. What has not been recognized, however, is that Matticks
involved the Habitual Offender provisions in which the sentence was
determined by the past criminality of the offender. Part XXI deals
with future predictions of behaviour which is fundamentally different
from the situation in Matticks. It is true that D.O.'s are more serious
criminals than habitual offenders, but this does not validate the
process by which they have been confined. Surely this difference
warrants at least a fresh analysis of Part XXI under section 9 of our
entrenched Charter.
ii) Judicial Discretion
The second area of challenge is based on the fact that even if an
individual meets the criteria of Part XXI, the Court still has the
discretion not to sentence him to preventive detention. Re Moore and
the Queen is a good example of this.107 Ewaschuk, J. found that Ms.
Moore was likely to cause death or other injury in the future. Howev-
er, he did not sentence her to preventive detention because he felt
that she had not caused enough serious injury to warrant such harsh
measures. Moore had more than 25 convictions including abduction,
arson, and serious weapons' offences. She had been labelled "the
most dangerous woman in Canada".'0 8 Yet because of the judge's
uncertainty, she was sentenced to two years less a day in a reformato-
ry. Ewaschuk, J. admits he came very close to sentencing her to
preventive detention. It is this narrow shadow of doubt that made the
difference between two years and potentially a life time in prison. '09
Before determining the case on the merits, Ewaschuk, J. ruled that
judicial discretion could be to the offender's benefit and thus could
not be challenged. It is difficult to explain this logic to those who are
on the other side of the discretion.
The fact that all D.O.'s are not treated equally has met the same
response under section 9 as it did under section 7. The discretion and
flexibility are necessary to make an accurate assessment of each
offender." 0
107. Supra, note 58.
108. See Toronto Star, February 12, 1984 at p. 6.
109. One cannot help but wonder whether a man with such a record would receive
such lenience. The Star depicts the rather bizarre scene of Ms. Moore thanking the
judge as she is "led away beaming" to serve her reformatory sentence. Perhaps
women are seen as less threatening than men.
110. R. v. Gustavson, supra, note 98.
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In a survey of all the Charter decisions on Part XXI, this author
has been unable to find any serious attempt to deal with or justify the
vast disparity of application at either level of the process.
Section 12
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusu-
al treatment or punishment.
It was suggested earlier in this paper that an indeterminate sentence
can have devastating effects on an offender. One would expect,
therefore, that the judiciary would give serious consideration to the
question of cruel and unusual punishment. With perhaps one excep-
tion, this has not been the case.
Section 2(b) of the Bill ofRights is virtually identical to section 12.
Much of the debate surrounding 2(b) centered on i) whether the
"and" between cruel and unusual was to be read conjunctively or
disjunctively and ii) whether American jurisprudence was relevant in
Canada given that the Bill of Rights was not a constitutional
document.
Prior to 1976, the courts tended to read the "and" conjunctively
so that a punishment could only violate 2(b) if it was both cruel and
unusual; unusual in this context meaning infrequent. This presents
obvious problems. A government could virtually insulate itself from
challenge as long as it applied any cruel punishment frequently. By
definition then, all wide scale forms of punishment would be
excluded from the analysis.
R. v. Roestad"' was the first dangerous offender case to raise
section 2(b). The Court held that a punishment had to be cruel and
unusual; cruelty being determined by the object of the punishment.
Since the object of Part XXI was public protection, it could not be
seen as cruel. Therefore, the Court did not bother to address the
meaning of unusual. Graburn, J. did concede that if the object were
to inflict suffering, an indeterminate sentence would be cruel.
This is rather bizarre logic. It ignores the means by which a pun-
ishment achieves its object. To the offender, an indeterminate sent-
ence is an indeterminate sentence, whatever the object. By defining
cruelty from the perspective of the state, rather than that of the
offender, it would be easy to sustain cruel punishments. Just because
the object is valid, it cannot absolve the Court from scrutinizing the
11. Supra, note 96.
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means.
Several recent decisions have relied on the Supreme Court of Can-
ada case which held that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual
punishment under the Bill of Rights. I2 It is necessary to look at this
decision because it is often used as the standard against which inde-
terminate sentences are compared.
Ritchie, J. for the majority, held that section 2(b) was subordinate
to section 1(a) under which an individual could be deprived of life,
liberty and security of the person if it was done by due process of law.
He also held that the "and" was conjunctive, requiring a punishment
to be both cruel and unusual. Most astoundingly, he held that the
absence of a non obstante clause indicated that the legislature did not
intend that the Bill of Rights should apply to the death penalty.
Finally, Ritchie, J. rejected the relevance of American jurisprudence
because the status of the Bill of Rights was fundamentally different
from that of the American constitution.
Not surprisingly, Laskin, C.J.C. (Spence and Dickson, JJ. concur-
ring) could not sit back and accept this narrow literal approach. We
thus have a second judgment, concurring in result, but not in tone.
Laskin rejected both the subordination of section 2(b) and the con-
junctive interpretation found in the Ritchie decision. The proper way
to interpret "cruel and unusual", according to Laskin, was to see the
words as:
interacting expressions colouring each other, so to speak, and
hence to be considered together as a compendious expression of a
norm.
1 13
Although most of the cases on Part XXI have generally accepted
that the approach of the late Chief Justice is the preferable one, few
have applied it in the spirit in which it was written. Great reliance has
been placed on the result of Miller and Cockriell for if the death
penalty is not cruel, then what lawful punishment could be? Unfor-
tunately, this reliance has taken the place of any careful analysis of
the issues involved. In R. v. Simon (No. 3) for example, section 12
was dispensed with in one sentence:
As to section 12, it need only be mentioned that both capital
punishment and long minimum sentences ... have also been held
not to conflict with s. 2(b) of the Canadian Bill ofRights.14
112. R. v.Miller and Cockriell (1976), 31C.C.C. (2d) 177.
113. Ibid., at 184.
114. (1982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 557 (N.W.T.S.C.) at 561.
377 The Dalhousie Law Journal
O Hearn, J. in Lyons held that the Laskin approach was correct
and then went on to discuss what punishments would be considered
cruel:
For example, in certain countries today where they use torture and
things of that kind to inflict pain ... We no longer stretch people
on the rack. We no longer... use the iron maiden... People no
longer have their eyes gouged out or their noses docked or their
ears docked or their hands cut off. I"5
Is it to this that we should turn for guidance?
In R. v. Morrison, 6 the Court merely relied on dictionary defini-
tions of "cruel" and "unusual" and then went on to follow Simon in
holding that if the death penalty is not cruel, neither could indeter-
minate sentences be.
Because the courts have brushed aside Charter arguments so rapid-
ly, there has been little need to deal with the reasonable limits clause
in section 1. It has received some attention under section 12 although
the correct interpretation is by no means clear. In Re Moore and the
Queen, Ewaschuk, J. held that section 1 had no application to sec-
tion 12 because section 12:
contains its own modifier... (and) the provision is self defined as
to what constitutes a reasonable limitation." 7
In Re Mitchell and the Queen, 18 however, Linden, J. left open the
role of section 1 in his observation that the Crown had not presented
evidence to show that the indeterminate sentence was a reasonable
limit.
It is this writer's opinion that the approach of Ewaschuk, J. is the
appropriate one. If a punishment can be justified in a free and demo-
cratic society, then surely it cannot be considered cruel and unusual.
Put the other way, surely we in Canada cannot justify cruel and
unusual punishment as reasonable.
Ewaschuk, J. also showed a willingness to use the criteria set out
by Tarnopolsky in his definitive article on section 2(b) of the Bill of
Rights. "' Although there was an attempt to analyze the section 12
115. Supra, note 91 at 388.
116. (1983), 10 W.C.B. 171 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
117. Supra, note 58 at 313.
118. (1983), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. H.C.J.).
119. Tarnopolsky, "Just Deserts or Cruel and Unusual Treatment or Punishment"
(1978), 10Ott. L. Rev. 1.
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issue, it leaves the reader with more questions than answers.
First, Ewaschuk, J. merely assumed that a large majority of Cana-
dians would approve of indeterminate sentences if they knew about
them.
Secondly, he held that the provisions were applied in accordance
with ascertained standards throughout Canada. He did not say why
or what the standards were. One need only recall the appalling
statistics from the Ouimet Report and this blanket assertion becomes
questionable.
Thirdly, Ewaschuk, J. found that there was a social purpose for
Part XXI: public protection. This is indisputably a valid purpose but
there is little evidence that the provisions are really achieving this
objective.
The fourth criteria considered was whether Part XXI accords with
public standards of decency or whether it offends our social con-
science. Unfortunately, Ewaschuk, J. is probably correct in assuming
that it does not shock our social conscience. Perhaps however, this
says more about our social conscience than it does about Part XXI.
The final criterion was similar to the fourth: is preventive detention
degrading to human dignity? Again we are presented only with a
conclusion:
... the punishment is not grossly disproportionate to the crime
and the offender's potential harm to others. 20
This writer is not suggesting that D.O.'s necessarily spend more
time in prison than their crimes warrant. What is being suggested is
that indeterminancy is neither necessary nor in fact beneficial for the
offender or for society.
This discussion would not be complete without mentioning the one
case where section 12 prevailed. Since it is not a decision on the
present Part XXI provisions, it is of limited application.
In Re Mitchell and the Queen, 121 the applicant sought a writ of
habeus corpus and certiorari to quash his sentence under the old
Habitual Offender legislation. It was argued that continued detention
under the pre-1977 legislation was both arbitrary (s. 9) and cruel and
unusual (s. 12) because the legislation had been repealed and there
was no suggestion that Mitchell was dangerous.
The section 9 argument was rejected. However, Linden, J. did
agree that the sentence was so excessive that it outraged standards of
120. Re Moore and the Queen, supra, note 58 at 313.
121. Supra, note 118.
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decency. Mr. Mitchell had served over thirteen years for fourteen
property offences each involving less than fifty dollars! Linden, J.
found that the sentence was totally out of proportion to the severity
of the offences and that continued detention could not be justified.
However, there was one caveat to this decision. The Court agreed to
grant a remedy under section 24 of the Charter only if Mitchell could
show that he was not dangerous. This onus is extraordinary given
that the Crown had never been required to prove that he was dan-
gerous. The Habitual Offender legislation had nothing to do with
dangerousness. Although Mitchell subsequently met this burden,
surely the Court was misguided in requiring him to disprove what
had never been proven.
It is important to stress that Mr. Justice Linden did not find
preventive detention per se to be cruel and unusual. Rather, con-
tinued detention, under legislation since repealed, would violate sec-
tion 12 if the applicant were not dangerous. This last requirement
would take the existing provisions outside the realm of Mitchell.
Nevertheless, it is a welcome decision and reflects the failure of the
government to enact reasonable provisions for the existing Habitual
Offenders when the legislation was repealed.
2. Legislative Options
It will be apparent by this stage that there is room for much
improvement to Part XXI. Alternatives range from increasing pro-
cedural protections through to the possibility of repealing all provi-
sions dealing with dangerous offenders as a special group. This paper
will by no means cover all options. What will be attempted is to
present a workable alternative which, although still fraught with
problems, is better than our existing legislation. Options that will not
be explored here include the use of the civil commitment procedures
if offenders are dangerous on release, providing for jury trial-type
hearings to determine status, and detailed provisions for judicial
review as the Ouimet Report recommended years ago.
The aim of any replacement for Part XXI should be to protect the
public without sacrificing the rights of the offender. Implicit in our
present system is the belief that a fixed sentence is not adequate
because the offender might still be dangerous after this term. The
Dangerous Offenders 380
great difficulty then, is that we are relying on a present prediction to
establish dangerousness many years in the future. All predictions are
of dubious value, but their accuracy must surely diminish as time
passes.
In response to this criticism, one could consider the following
alternative. Sentence the offender to a fixed term for his substantive
offence. This term could be extended for a specific length of time, if it
could be established that the offender were still dangerous at the time
of release. A very similar alternative would be to sentence the indi-
vidual for the offence he was convicted of and to hold a Part XXI
hearing only at his release date, if he were still believed to be
dangerous.
There are certainly disadvantages to these models. Questions about
double jeopardy might be raised. The threat of extension may seem
very like an indeterminate sentence; in the eyes of the offender it
might appear to be an arbitrary abuse of power. There is also the
danger that some judges might impose harsher sentences on those
they fear to be violent without adequate proof of their suspicions.
However, either of these alternatives would be better than our
present system. First, the onus of establishing dangerousness, after
the offender has served his sentence, would be on the Crown. At
present the offender has the burden of satisfying the Parole Board
that he is no longer dangerous. As was discussed above, this is espe-
cially difficult in a prison setting.
Secondly, it would be up to the court to determine whether an
extension were justified, and not the Parole Board. Although proce-
dures in parole hearings are gradually improving, the procedures are
still far less than those offered by a court.
Thirdly, it is likely that the accuracy of predictions would increase
because they would be limited to the immediate future. The question
becomes "is he dangerous now?" not "will he be dangerous in x
number of years?"
Fourthly, both of these models would decrease the prosecutor's
unfair bargaining power. The threat of a Part XXI hearing could no
longer be held over the head of an offender who had bad criminal
record and a weak case.
The advocates of preventive detention say that indeterminancy is
an essential element in motivating the individual to rehabilitate him-
self in order to secure release. It has already been suggested that in
fact indeterminate sentences feed the offender's sense of hopelessness
and despair, since there is no real chance of earning release. These
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two alternatives might truly encourage an individual to "behave" in
prison, because the result of the hearing after release would depend
on it. And of course, if he behaves there may not be a hearing.I22 In
this sense, at least, the offender might have something to work for.
Also, the stigma which a dangerous offender carries with him would
no longer colour the perceptions of the correctional staff.
Finally, our criminal justice system would benefit, albeit perhaps
only symbolically. We would then sentence all offenders for the
crimes they have committed, and the judiciary would reclaim much
of the power to control sentencing.
One of the more unusual alternatives is that suggested by Fran-
kel. '2 3 It is important to note that Frankel believes we punish people
in order to feel we are in control of such arbitrary events as violent
crime. It is precisely for these symbolic reasons that he rejects preven-
tive detention. In order to retain any sense of rationality we must not
depart from our present "criminal act - punishment" paradigm.
It is within this context that Frankel puts forth the suggestion that
we should pay individuals when we subject them to preventive deten-
tion. Just as we compensate someone with money for the expropria-
tion of his property, we should also pay a man for the freedom we are
denying him beyond the sanction for his particular offence. Frankel
sees this gesture as vindicating the value of human liberty. Rather
than cheapening this value, the symbolic recognition of it would
make us more aware that we are consciously depriving an individual
of his rights. An inherent safeguard would be built into this system. If
the Crown had to pay individuals subject to preventive detention,
Part XXI would not be applied capriciously. The issues raised by
Frankel are of tremendous importance. In a symbolic way, his sug-
gestion is a good one; in a practical sense, it would probably fail.
V. Conclusion
This paper has been highly critical of the existing "dangerous offend-
er" provisions. However, this is not to suggest that these persons are
really misunderstood social outcasts who should be released and
allowed to live freely in society. They are not. They are convicted
criminals and should be treated as such. But this criminality is but a
chosen part of these individuals' lives, and it should not be used to
122. This raises the question of whether prison behaviour is ever a reliable predictor
of behaviour outside the prison.
123. Frankel, "Comments on Preventive Detention", (1970), J. of Legal Ed. 53.
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define their existence. Just as no human life is expendable, so it is
equally important to maintain a criminal justice system that will
protect the rights of every individual. By relegating one group of
offenders to this unusual status, we not only subject them to an
extraordinary form of punishment, but we are also abandoning some
of the most fundamental tenets of our criminal justice system.
Perhaps the most apt commentary on preventive detention comes
from neither a psychiatrist nor a lawyer:
"There's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being pun-
ished: and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of
course the crime comes last of all."
"Suppose he never commits the crime?" asked Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen
responded...
Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of course it would be all
the better," she said: "But it wouldn't be all the better his being
punished."
"You're wrong .. " said the Queen. "Were you ever
punished?"
"Only for faults." said Alice.
"And you were all the better for it, I know!" the Queen said
triumphantly.
"Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for," said
Alice: 'That makes all the difference."
"But if you hadn't done them," the Queen said, "that would
have been better still; better, and better, and better!" Her voice
went higher with each "better" till it got quite to a squeak. ...
Alice thought, "There's a mistake somewhere-"1
24
124. Lewis Carroll, cited in Dershowitz, "Preventive Detention" in Crime, Law and
Society (Goldstein and Goldstein (eds.) 1971 at 309).
